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Summary 
In each of the past five fiscal years (FY2001-FY2005), Congress has conditioned 
U.S. aid to Serbia on a presidential certification that Serbia has met certain conditions, 
including cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). The 1 Ogth Congress is considering similar certification provisions 
in the FY2006 foreign aid bill. Supporters of aid conditionality say such provisions may 
have spurred Serbia's cooperation with the Tribunal. While the certification process 
continues to enjoy support in Congress, the Administration appears to favor ending it 
soon, as well as shifting responsibility for prosecuting war crimes from the ICTY to 
local courts. This report will be updated as events warrant. For more information on 
Serbia and Montenegro, see CRS Report RL3O37 1, Serbia and Montenegro: Current 
Situation and US.  Policy. 
Background 
In each of the past five fiscal years (FY2001-FY2005), Congress has conditioned 
U.S. aid to Serbia after a certain date of that year on a presidential certification that Serbia 
has met three conditions. They are cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia (ICTY); ending support for separate Bosnian Serb institutions; and 
protecting minority rights and the rule of law, including the release of political prisoners. 
The provision also has recommended that U.S. support for loans from international 
financial institutions to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the now-defunct federation 
of Serbia and Montenegro) be conditioned on the certification. The certification does not 
apply to aid to Montenegro, now Serbia's partner in a loose union simply called "Serbia 
and Montenegro," or Kosovo, which is nominally a Serbian province but is administered 
by a U.N. mission. The provision also has not applied to humanitarian or democratization 
aid to Serbia.' The amounts of aid affected by these conditions may be relatively modest 
Another provision in foreign operations appropriations bills in recent years has dealt with U.S. 
aid to Serbia (in the FY2004 bill, it is Section 570). It has conditioned U.S. aid to all countries, 
entities and municipalities in the region on cooperation with the ICTY. However, this provision 
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in the context of the global U S .  aid program, but are significant for Serbia and 
Montenegro. In FY200 1, the United States provided $133.8 million in aid to Serbia, and 
$106.7 million was provided in FY2002. The Administration allocated $1 10 million for 
Serbia for FY2003 and $95 million in FY2004. The FY2005 foreign aid measure (P.L. 
108-447) provides $73.6 million for Serbia. SEED aid is being used to help Serbia 
establish a free market economy, including advice on restructuring the banking sector, 
privatizing large firms, assisting legislative and judicial reform, and providing credit 
facilities to help small business and develop a mortgage market. Other SEED aid is aimed 
at strengthening democratic institutions and civil society, including local government.' 
The certification process typically affects a relatively modest portion of the amount 
allocated for any given year, due to the deadline being set in March of the fiscal year or 
later, and the exclusion of humanitarian and democratization aid. 
While these sums may not be especially large, the impact of the aid conditions can 
be magnified by a provision that if Serbia does not meet them, the United States should 
vote against financing from the international financial institutions, a key source of funding 
for Serbia. Moreover, while the European Union has not explicitly conditioned its aid to 
Serbia on war crimes cooperation, EU officials have made clear to Serbian leaders that 
a closer relationship with the EU, including a Stabilization and Association agreement 
that could lead to eventual membership, requires Serbian cooperation with the ICTY. The 
United States and its allies have also conditioned Serbia and Montenegro's participation 
in NATO's Partnership for Peace program on cooperation with the ICTY. 
U.S. conditions on aid to Serbia may have had a significant impact on Serbian 
cooperation with the Tribunal. Since the coming to power of Serbian democrats in late 
2000, Serbian cooperation with the ICTY has followed a similar pattern each year: Serbia 
delivers several indictees to the Tribunal just before or, at most, a few weeks after the 
certification deadline. The Administration makes the certification as required by the 
legislation, and urges Serbia to do more. However, Serbian cooperation then slows, with 
Serbian leaders claiming that political and legal obstacles preclude greater efforts. 
Nevertheless, more indictees are delivered as the next deadline for certification 
approaches, and so on. 
For example, the conditions on U.S. aid to Serbia were an important factor in the 
timing of the arrest of Milosevic by Serbian police on April 1, 200 1, one day after the 
March 3 1 certification deadline set by the legislation. When making the certification on 
April 2, Secretary of State Colin Powell warned that U.S. support for an international aid 
conference for Serbia would depend on Milosevic's delivery to the Tribunal. Milosevic 
was delivered to the Tribunal in The Hague on June 28,2001, one day before the donors 
conference. Serbian cooperation then decreased significantly. After the FY2002 deadline 
passed without certification, in April 2002 the Yugoslav parliament passed a law on 
cooperation with the ICTY, although the law was criticized as flawed and unnecessary by 
the ICTY, the United States and other Western countries. Nevertheless, it provided the 
domestic political context in Serbia for six indictees to surrender to the Tribunal in late 
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has not been the main stumbling block to aid to Serbia, due to extensive use by the 
Administration of waiver authority in the legislation. 
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April and early May 2002. The Administration made the FY2002 certification on May 2 1, 
2002. 
The FY2003 foreign aid appropriations measure was included as part of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7). The bill contained 
certification provisions on aid to Serbia similar to the FY2001 and FY2002 bills, and 
required the President to make the certification by June 15,2003. In a demonstration of 
the power of dangerous forces threatening cooperation with the ICTY and democracy in 
Serbia, on March 12, 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was assassinated. 
Investigators discovered that the crime was committed by organized crime figures who 
reportedly feared prosecution for war crimes and other criminal activities. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Belgrade on April 2, 2003, to demonstrate 
U.S. support for Serbia in the wake of Djindjic's murder. Secretary Powell also discussed 
the need to transfer former Bosnian Serb army chief Ratko Mladic and two other 
indictees, Miroslav Radic and Veselin Sljivancanin, former Yugoslav Army officers 
wanted for crimes committed in Vukovar, Croatia. Djindjic's murder appeared to 
galvanize Serbian leaders in the fight against organized crime leaders and war criminals. 
Miroslav Radic, Veselin Sljivancanin, paramilitary leader Franko Simatovic, and former 
intelligence chief Jovica Stanisic were turned over to the ICTY in May and June 2003. 
Secretary of State Powell made the FY2003 certification on June 15,2003, but said that 
Serbia and Montenegro still needed to demonstrate their full cooperation to the ICTY, 
including the transfer of Mladic and former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. 
It should be noted that ICTY cooperation is only one of the three conditions for U.S. 
aid to Serbia. However, in FY200 I-FY2003, the Administration accepted the assurances 
of Serbian authorities that they had ended support to separate Republic Srpska institutions 
(which had included paying the salaries of RS army officers). Neither this condition, nor 
the third condition, dealing with minority rights and the release of ethnic Albanian 
political prisoners, has proved to be a stumbling block to certification, particularly after 
the release of Kosovar prisoners from Serbian jails in March 2002. 
The FY2004 foreign operations appropriations bill (incorporated into H.R. 2673, an 
omnibus appropriations bill) contained the same certification provisions as previous years, 
requiring the President to make the certification by March 3 1,2004. The Administration 
did not make the FY2004 certification and suspended $16 million in FY2004 aid to 
Serbia. 
FY2005 Legislation and Serbian Compliance 
The FY2005 foreign aid appropriations were incorporated into an omnibus spending 
bill (P.L. 108-447). It contained the same certification process as the FY2004 bill. The 
provision conditioned U.S. aid to Serbia after May 3 1,2005, on "(I) cooperating with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) including access for investigators, 
the provision of documents, and the surrender and transfer of indictees or assistance in 
their apprehension, including making all practicable efforts to apprehend and transfer 
Ratko Mladic; (2) taking steps that are consistent with the Dayton Accords to end Serbian 
financial, political, security and other support which has served to maintain separate 
Republika Srpska institutions; and (3) taking steps to implement policies which reflect 
a respect for minority rights and the rule of law, including the release ofpolitical prisoners 
from Serbian jails and prisons." It says the Administration "should" vote for loans and 
aid for Serbia and Montenegro from international financial institutions after May 3 1, 
2005, if the certification is made. The conference report deleted a Senate provision to 
deduct from U.S. aid to Serbia an amount equal to Serbian government aid to indicted war 
criminals. 
In January 2005, the Administration announced that because there had been "no 
improvement" in Belgrade's cooperation with the Tribunal, the United States would 
withhold $10 million in FY2005 aid from Serbia. U.S. Ambassador to Serbia and 
Montenegro Michael Polt said that the aid cuts could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. 
technical advisors from Serbian ministries working on such issues as World Trade 
Organization membership and economic reform. However, an Administration spokesman 
noted that the remaining portion of the $73.6 million in aid to Serbia would still go to 
"organizations and programs outside of the central government that are committed to 
r e f~ rm."~  
On June 9,2005, the Administration certified that Serbia had met the conditions set 
out in the FY2005 legislation, freeing up the $10 million that had been suspended in 
January. Administration officials cited Serbia's transfer of a large number of ICTY 
indictees to the Tribunal as justification for the certification but noted with regret that 
Mladic and Karadzic were still at large. On June 9, Undersecretary of State Nicholas 
Bums said in Belgrade that the Administration believed that Serbia is working "very 
seriously" to find Mladic and that Belgrade would make a "sincere attempt" to capture 
him or have him voluntarily surrender. He said the United States was "confident" 
Mladic's days of freedom "were numbered." h July 2005, Burns said that the United 
States was willing to open a "new and expanded relationship" with Serbia once Mladic 
is transferred to the ICTY. 
In a June 13,2005, report to the Security Council, ICTY chief prosecutor Carla Del 
Ponte said that there had been a "major change" in Serbia's cooperation in the Tribunal. 
She said access to witnesses and to military and other government documents "is 
continuously improving" but "remains very slow and cumbersome." She noted that since 
December 2004, Serbia, sometimes with the assistance of Bosnian Serb leaders, 
transferred 14 indictees to the ICTY. However, Del Ponte stressed that of the ten 
remaining indictees at large, seven of them (including Karadzic and Mladic) are "within 
reach of Serbian authorities." She said that Serbian pledges to deliver these men to the 
Tribunal appear to be hampered by Serbia's unwillingness to detain them, relying instead 
solely on the prospect of voluntary surrenders. 
FY2006 Legislation 
On June 28, 2005, the House passed H.R. 3057, the FY2006 foreign operations 
appropriations bill. Section 563 of the bill contains the same certification provisions as 
in FY2005, with the President required to make the certification by May 3 1,2006. The 
Senate passed its version of H.R. 3057 on July 20. The Senate's Serbian aid certification 
provision (Sec. 6063) differs from the House version in that it specifically names 
' Statement by kchard Boucher, Spokesman, January 13, 2005, from the State Department 
website [http://www.state.gov]. 
Karadzic as well as Mladic as indictees that Serbia must turn over to the Tribunal. 
However, the Senate provision provides for an exception if the Administration 
determines and reports to the Appropriations Committee that neither man is "residing" 
in Serbia. The committee report accompanying the bill expressed the Committee's 
willingness to drop the certification provision if substantial progress is made in ICTY 
cooperation, including the transfer of Mladic and Karadzic. The Senate bill recommends 
$75 million in aid for Serbia, $15 million more than the Administration's request. The 
House bill does not earmark or recommend a specific aid amount for Serbia. 
U.S. Policy 
Although it has used the aid conditions to extract at least partial Serbia cooperation 
with the ICTY, the Administration has shown signs of impatience with the certification 
process and what the Administration believes is the seemingly open-ended nature of the 
ICTY's prosecutions. The Administration favors shifting responsibility for prosecuting 
all but a handful of major war crimes cases from the ICTY to Serbian courts. 
The United States, along with other countries, successfully pushed for the adoption 
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1503 in August 2003. The resolution calls for ICTY 
to complete its investigations by 2004, its trials by 2008 and all appeals by 2010. U.S. 
war crimes envoy Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper and other Administration officials 
have suggested that if Ratko Mladic were turned over to the Tribunal, it would create a 
new, more positive environment in cooperation with the ICTY that could result in the 
remaining Serbian indictees being tried in Serbian  court^.^ The United States is assisting 
Serbia's efforts to prosecute war criminals itself by providing assistance in such areas as 
helping to set up witness protection programs, providing training to judges and 
contributing funds to help establish a new Serbian court to try organized crime and war 
crimes cases. 
On November 3,2003, the Administration certified that Serbia and Montenegro is 
eligible for Normal Trade Relations (NTR) with the United States. The FRY'S NTR status 
was suspended in 1992, in response to its role in the war in Bosnia, according to the terms 
of P.L. 102-420 (106 Stat. 2149). The legislation permits the Administration to restore 
NTR to Serbia and Montenegro if the President certifies that the FRY had ceased armed 
conflict with other peoples of the former Yugoslavia, agreed to respect the borders of the 
former Yugoslav states, and ended support to Bosnian Serb forces.' Administration 
officials say the move was made in response to the improved situation in Serbia, 
especially in defense reform and cutting links between the Serbian and Bosnian Serb 
armed forces. Serbian officials hailed the restoration of NTR, saying it would give a 
significant boost to Serbia's exports to the United States in such areas as furniture, 
hunting rifles and pharmaceuticals. One Serbian leader added that the granting of NTR 
Discussions with Administration officials, November 2003. 
On March 5,2003, the House passed H.R. 1047, which, among other provisions, would permit 
the President to restore Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status to Serbia and Montenegro, 
notwithstanding the provisions of P.L. 102-420 (106 Stat. 2149). The Senate has not approved 
similar legislation. 
was more important to Serbia than the aid certification issue.6 The Administration is also 
considering whether to grant duty-free treatment to some products from Serbia and 
Montenegro under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), but no decision has been 
taken on the issue. 
Some have argued that certification has played an important role in encouraging 
Serbian leaders to deal with difficult issues that they would have rather avoided. Serbia's 
democracy will be healthier in the long run, proponents of certification say, if Serbs come 
to terms with the war crimes issue, especially since many of the war criminals continue 
to be threats to reforms and reformers, as demonstrated by the murder of Prime Minister 
Djindjic. On the other hand, it can be argued that while they may be positive for Serbia 
in the long term, the aid conditions have been a domestic political liability for Serbian 
reformers. Serbian leaders complain that what they see as unending Western demands 
upon them reduce their credibility in the eyes of the Serbian public. Cooperation with the 
Tribunal has aggravated tensions among reformers, but it should be noted that it is only 
one of many issues dividing them, which include poor economic performance, scandals, 
and personal ambitions of their leaders. 
On December 28,2003, Serbia held parliamentary elections. The main winner in the 
election was the strongly nationalist and anti-ICTY Serbian Radical Party, which won 82 
of the 250 seats in the body. On March 3, 2004, the Serbian parliament approved a 
minority government of democratic parties, led by Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, 
leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). The most controversial aspect of the new 
government is its dependence on support from the Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia 
(SPS), which does not have ministers in the government but provides it with a majority 
in parliament. SPS leaders have repeatedly threatened to bring down the government if 
it transfers any more indictees to the Tribunal. The anti-ICTY mood in the parliament 
was underlined by the parliament's passage on March 30,2004 (i.e., one day before the 
certification deadline) of a law, supported by Kostunica, to provide Serbian government 
payments to ICTY indictees. However, the law's implementation was suspended by the 
Serbian Constitutional Court on the grounds of its unconstitutionality. 
In contrast to past years, the FY2004 and FY2005 certification provisions and 
resulting suspension of some U.S. aid to Serbia were slow to improve Serbian cooperation 
with the ICTY. One possible reason is the political situation in Serbia noted above. The 
government is weak and therefore reluctant to take politically risky steps on ICTY 
cooperation, and Kostunica is disinclined to do so in any case. One bright spot is the 
victory of Democratic Party leader Boris Tadic in Serbian presidential elections in June 
2004. President Tadic favors cooperation with the ICTY. Another possible factor 
hindering Serbian compliance with the certification provision is that Serbia's non- 
cooperation with the ICTY does not seem to have affected its access to international 
loans. Serbia's ability to secure critically needed international loans (as well as continued 
EU aid to Serbia) may reduce the political impact of the U S .  aid certification provision. 
Tanjug news agency dispatch, November 2,3003, as carried by BBC Monitoring International. 
